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This is a terrific book, scholarly but at the same time elegantly written and 
entertaining. Zatlin succeeds in fulfilling a number of varied objectives, which include 
a detailed history of the political economy of the German Democratic Republic and an 
innovative account of its ultimate failure during the 1980s. He achieves this, firstly, 
by making the theory of money and the contradictions of its implementation the entry 
point from which the reader is asked to observe the forty years of economic history in 
the exotic and artificial construct that was the GDR. Zatlin then crystallizes his 
analysis of the GDR’s failure, by asserting that one (key) deficiency was the 
monetization and commodification of economic relations in a society which was 
supposed to achieve precisely the opposite; by setting itself up as a (poor) competitor 
to the more efficiently monetized and commodified Federal Republic and, more 
dramatically, by using the DM as a parallel trading currency in the Intershops and 
exploiting official and black market exchange rates in the Exquisit and Delikat chains, 
the GDR condemned itself in ideological terms and in practice. 
Zatlin does not overwork this core insight, nor drift into the dangerous (not to say 
dull) waters of “demonstrating” a theoretical hypothesis. Rather he tells an enthralling 
story which interweaves the philosophy of money as intellectual history with the 
ideological history of the SED, with the improvisational shifts in the Politbüro’s 
policy and with the social history of the population as it struggled to cope with the 
smoke and mirrors deployed by their shabby, mendacious and increasingly desperate 
leaders. 
For this he deploys an impressive range of sources including, most fascinatingly, the 
reports of the Stasi concerning the ‘mood of the people’ and – in implicit criticism – 
the way that state policy was risking the loyalty of the mass of the population through 
ill-judged policy. He also uses interviews with former citizens of the GDR as well as 
with key actors in the political and economic elite of both German states, including 
Hans Modrow, Gerhard Schürer, Klaus Höpcke and Christian Scholwin, as well as 
Bundesbank presidents, Karl-Otto Pöhl, Hans Tietmeyer and Helmut Schlesinger. 
Zatlin therefore avoids the dullness of many histories of the GDR while satisfying the 
usual requirements of good scholarship. One of the delights of the narrative is the 
frequent use of the jokes that circulated in the later years of the GDR which mocked 
the hypocrisy of the Politbüro leadership. For example, in reference to the Delikat 
stores which stocked luxury goods from the West and which earned the state hefty 
profits from its abuse of both the FRG and the GDR’s own consumers, one joke 
asked: ‘What is the phase of transition from socialism to communism called?’ 
Answer: ‘Delikatism’ (269) 
Aside from the well-known nonsenses of state-planning creating alternately supply-
bottlenecks and wasted surpluses, Zatlin also focuses on the particular disaster of the 
GDR’s foreign economic policy which was directed increasingly to the reduction in 
the state’s indebtedness to West Germany. The re- (or mis-) allocation of the GDR’s 
resources to generate export earnings as a means of debt repayment involved the 
cardinal neglect of investment – in new, modernized infrastructure and production 
capacity – and the consequent legacy of low productivity and environmental 
degradation which accumulated during the fateful 1980s. Responsibility for this 
‘cannibalization of the East German industrial base’ (126) is laid fair and square on 
Honecker and his right-hand man, Günter Mittag. Despite mutterings within the 
Politbüro and the wider party and despite the criticism of Mittag’s leadership by the 
Stasi from the mid-1980s onwards, the shambles persisted right to the end and the 
surreal celebration of the GDR’s fortieth anniversary in October 1989. Zatlin 
acknowledges that the GDR did not collapse like several developing countries in the 
1980s nor default on its debts, like Poland and Romania and thus describes its failure 
more in societal and ideological terms, inasmuch as ‘the SED’s economic policies 
generated the very kinds of social inequities based on material and spiritual want for 
which it criticized the West. ... (S)ocialist money, which was supposed to act as a 
conduit for social justice, had become a source of shortage and a symbol of 
disenfranchisement. By the 1980s, moreover, the glaring incommensurability between 
the SED’s aims and its accomplishments had destroyed communist ideology as a 
political force’ (322). 
It is difficult to do justice to a book of this quality and this scope in a short review. It 
might also seem churlish to find fault with such excellent history as Zatlin presents 
the reader. I would nevertheless suggest that an account of the GDR’s failure would 
also need to include a consideration of the extraordinary external circumstances of the 
country’s birth, the particular role of its foreign midwives, the dubious behaviour the 
domineering parent and the latter’s crucial removal of protection at the high point of 
the country’s crisis in the autumn of 1989. That said, there is little doubt that Zatlin’s 
history of money and political culture in the GDR will become standard reading for 
present and future students of central European economic and political history. And 
so it should. It is a wonderful example of the best kind of history. 
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